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DEMOCRACY’S DISTRUST 
Contested Values and the Decline of Expertise 
Suzanna Sherry*
Professor Dan Kahan’s rich Foreword gets some things exactly 
right.  As he documents, there is pervasive mistrust of the Supreme 
Court’s impartiality or neutrality.  And, as he also suggests, most con-
temporary scholarship is incorrect in its identification of the source of 
that mistrust.  If he persuades readers that we need a new explanation 
for the neutrality crisis, and new suggestions for combating it, he will 
have done constitutional scholarship a great service.  I also agree with 
many of his suggestions for going forward.  Like Kahan, I believe that 
hiding behind grand theories of constitutional interpretation does not 
constitute neutrality.
 
1  And I wholeheartedly agree that we would be 
better off with more judicial humility.  As Judge Learned Hand said 
many years ago, “the spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure 
that it is right.”2
Nevertheless, Kahan’s own explanation of the source of the prob-
lem — that psychological mechanisms keep people from dispassionate-
ly achieving their shared goals — is ultimately unsatisfying.  He sug-
gests that motivated reasoning and an identity-driven desire for 
government affirmation of their own worldview lead people to doubt 
the Court’s reliance on such seemingly objective evidence as empirical 
facts and expert testimony.  For this reason, Kahan argues, judicial 
opinions should rely less on traditional methods and sources, and in-
stead use communication techniques that affirm culturally diverse val-
ues.  Unfortunately, Kahan mistakes the causes of popular dissatisfac-
tion with the Court, an error that leads him both to understate the 
problem and to place responsibility for a remedy on the wrong parties. 
 
I make three related arguments in this Essay.  First, Kahan is mis-
taken when he suggests that disagreement about Supreme Court deci-
sions stems from disagreement about facts rather than about values.  
Second, the source of the problem is significantly broader than Kahan 
recognizes: Americans increasingly reject not just Supreme Court reli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
* Herman O. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY 
(2002). 
2 LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty (1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189, 190 
(Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). 
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ance on objective facts or expert evidence but the very idea of exper-
tise.  Finally, popular dissatisfaction with the Court’s decisions is fos-
tered and exacerbated by academic insistence that Justices are not le-
gal experts but are simply policymakers hiding behind a mask of 
judicial neutrality. 
Kahan goes astray at the very beginning, with his basic assump-
tions about consensus and dissensus.  He suggests that citizens with 
diverse cultural values “actually agree about policy ends” but “disagree 
about . . . empirical facts”3 and that “Americans are indeed fighting a 
‘culture war,’ but one over facts, not values.”4  And what are these 
values and policy ends on which most Americans agree?  Why, they 
are the ones that all right-thinking (and left-leaning) academics en-
dorse: a “genuinely liberal civic and political culture” in which “there is 
effective consensus that the state should refrain from imposing a moral 
orthodoxy.”5  The “great mass of citizens” — except for “those few who 
have not renounced zealotry” — “harbor no particular ambition to im-
pose their cultural values on others.”6
Tell that to those who believe that abortion is murder, or that ho-
mosexuality is a sin that undermines heterosexual marriage, or — a be-
lief shared by two-thirds of Americans
 
7
And these controversial topics are only the most obvious examples 
of differing cultural values.  The vast majority of the Supreme Court 
cases that cause a public uproar are about values.  Whether a corpo-
rate right of free speech should exist at all — much less whether allow-
ing corporate speech in the form of campaign contributions outweighs 
any detrimental effect on elections
 — that the United States is a 
Christian nation.  Do these citizens want to impose their values on 
others?  Of course they do: they believe that what their opponents be-
lieve, say, and do is immoral.  The dispute between these citizens and 
the ones who support abortion, gay rights, and religious diversity or 
religious neutrality is about values, not about facts.  And the same can 
be said of moral advocates on the left: those who oppose the death 
penalty as murder or support affirmative action as necessary justice 
are equally eager to impose those values on the nation.  If this is zeal-
otry, most Americans have not renounced it. 
8
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term — Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011). 
 — turns primarily on one’s view of 
 4 Id. at 24. 
 5 Id. at 24–25. 
 6 Id. at 28. 
 7 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE & THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR 
THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, MANY AMERICANS UNEASY WITH MIX OF RELIGION AND 
POLITICS 5 (2006), available at http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Many-Americans-
Uneasy-with-Mix-of-Religion-and-Politics.aspx.  
 8 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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the appropriate role of corporations in our polity, and depends only 
tangentially on the actual effect of corporate contributions.  Whether 
the government should be allowed to take land for urban renewal pur-
poses9 depends on how we value personal property rights and com-
munity development, and whether we trust local government to get 
things right.  One’s view of affirmative action10
Even cases that seem to be about facts are often merely vehicles by 
which competing factions try to enact and protect as many of their 
policy preferences as the legal doctrines allow.  The public dispute 
about prohibiting the intact dilation and evacuation abortion proce-
dure
 does not depend solely 
on whether one believes that the effects of Jim Crow still linger but al-
so on whether it is fair or just to spread the burdens of segregation to 
other citizens (some but not all of whom might be descendants of its 
perpetrators). 
11 is less about whether it is safe or necessary and more about 
prohibiting or allowing as many abortions as possible.  Similarly, most 
people’s view of whether juveniles should be subject to the death pen-
alty12
Finally, in some controversial cases the facts that actually drive the 
decision are not the ones in dispute in the case, but are instead unstat-
ed foundational facts about the world in general.  Examples include 
the ratio of frivolous to meritorious cases (which might influence a 
judge’s determination of the appropriate standard for dismissing a 
case) or the prevalence of intentional discrimination in our society 
(which might influence the burden of proof in discrimination cases).
 turns not on adolescent brain chemistry but on the morality of 
capital punishment: there are probably few, if any, Americans who 
support the death penalty in general but oppose it for those who com-
mit heinous homicides a few weeks short of their eighteenth birthdays. 
13
Kahan’s starting premise — that Americans are not divided about 
cultural values — thus does not ring true, at least with respect to 
many of the cases that reach the Supreme Court.  Because he starts 
from the wrong place, his solution neglects the enduring role that con-
tested values play in our constitutional democracy.  Motivated cogni-
  
If the cause of the neutrality crisis is, as Kahan argues, that explicit 
judicial reliance on empirical facts is perceived through the distorting 
lens of motivated cognition, these cases in which the most important 
facts are not even discussed seem to be outside that explanation. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 10 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 11 See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 12 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 13 For elaboration, see Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 145. 
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tion is an interesting new tool of analysis, but it does not change the 
underlying cultural differences. 
Kahan’s focus on motivated cognition also blinds him to a more se-
rious and broad-reaching cause of popular resistance to the Court’s re-
liance on empirical facts or expert testimony, a cause that judges can 
do little to overcome. 
Kahan argues that the psychological mechanisms he describes as 
interfering with judgment are exacerbated by reasoned and apparently 
neutral arguments, such as those traditionally associated with good ju-
dicial craftsmanship.  Empirical facts and expert or scientific evidence 
fall into that category.  People are therefore suspicious when the Court 
portrays its decisions as resting on such facts or evidence. 
But the main culprit in encouraging resistance to expert knowledge 
is not motivated cognition.  It is the democratization of the creation 
and authoritativeness of knowledge.  Everyone is now an expert — 
from the user-created content of Wikipedia to self-diagnosis of medical 
conditions to a website that provides do-it-yourself legal documents,14 
we have created a society that finds experts unnecessary and even 
faintly suspect.  Despite Kahan’s protest to the contrary,15 science is in 
disrepute: More people believe in angels than in evolution, and belief 
in evolution only narrowly surpasses belief in UFOs.16
This deprecation of expertise is reminiscent of — and may be par-
tially derived from — the now outdated academic fascination with 
postmodern social constructionism.  The linkage between academic 
postmodernism and popular rejection of expertise is indirect and not 
subject to proof, but I would suggest that to the extent that academic 
currents are “in the air” — almost literally, on the airwaves and in the 
ether — they exert a subtle influence on the worldviews of the Ameri-
  Elected offi-
cials and candidates publicly deny the validity of facts on which there 
is scientific consensus.  Educators are not trusted to educate: growing 
numbers of people homeschool their children or demand inclusion of 
their favorite theories in the school curriculum regardless of the 
soundness of those theories.  (And it does not help the reputation of 
expertise that so-called experts in the financial arena have completely 
discredited themselves.)  An educated citizenry and wide dissemination 
of knowledge is beneficial, even necessary, in a democracy, but resting 
the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge on its popular ac-
ceptance rather than on its acceptance by experts in the relevant field 
does not serve that goal. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 See LEGALZOOM.COM, http://www.legalzoom.com/index1m.html (last visited Nov. 3, 
2011).  
 15 Kahan, supra note 3, at 75. 
 16 See Harris Poll, What People Do and Do Not Believe In (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris_Poll_2009_12_15.pdf.  
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can public at large.  One influential academic takes an idea that is 
popular in academic circles and puts it into an op-ed piece, and some 
pundit picks it up and spreads it on a blog or a radio talk-show, and 
pretty soon everyone believes it even if they have no idea where it 
came from.  Social constructionism may be just such a pervasive idea.  
Some two or three decades ago, academics across disciplines, including 
law, rejected the possibility of objective knowledge.  They argued in-
stead that knowledge and reality were socially constructed by those in 
power.17  Segments of the American public seem to have domesticated 
this postmodern skepticism by combining it with democratic anti-
elitism, ultimately trusting only knowledge that is created by demo-
cratic means.18
The Supreme Court’s neutrality crisis is a manifestation of this 
same rejection of expertise.  But the mistrust is even broader than 
Kahan recognizes, not only because it stems from a generalized rejec-
tion of experts, but also because many people no longer see judges as 
possessing legal expertise.  And for that we should blame not the Jus-
tices but the politicians, pundits, and legal academics who have for 
years been denigrating the concept of legal expertise. 
 
Even on “pure” questions of law, judges are not seen as neutral ex-
perts.  The reason for doubting judges is not, as Kahan suggests, that 
no judge can ever decide cases impartially because neutrality itself is a 
chimera.  I am not persuaded that such epistemic “neutrality skepti-
cism” is widespread among contemporary legal academics, much less 
among politicians and the public at large.  Today one does not see 
many arguments in either the law reviews or the op-ed pages denying 
that judicial neutrality is possible. 
Instead, we see a narrower form of skepticism: that whether or not 
judges can be neutral, in fact they do not decide cases impartially.  Ac-
cording to scholars taking this approach, a judge’s political and policy 
preferences determine his or her votes in individual cases.  Constitu-
tional adjudication is just politics by another name, and judges are 
merely legislators in black robes.  We might label this view “practical 
neutrality skepticism” to distinguish it from the epistemic skepticism 
that Kahan describes.  It originated, in a much more sophisticated and 
nuanced form, with the Legal Realists, who believed that judges were 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 For an elaboration and critique of this movement in law, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER 
& SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON (1997). 
 18 For elaboration, see Suzanna Sherry, Democracy and the Death of Knowledge, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1053 (2007).  This democratic anti-elitism is the most recent form of the longstanding Amer-
ican anti-intellectualism.  See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN 
AMERICAN LIFE (1963); SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON (2008). 
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inevitably influenced by many things including their worldview.19  The 
“attitudinalist” movement in political science flattened and coarsened 
the idea into two binary oppositions — one between law and politics 
and another between liberals and conservatives — and used statistical 
analyses to claim politics as almost the sole predictor of legal out-
comes.20
Unlike epistemic skepticism, practical skepticism does undermine 
trust in the judiciary and thus contributes to the neutrality crisis.  Ad-
vocates of practical skepticism stoke the fires of mistrust in the same 
way that Justice Scalia did in his Plata dissent
  It is this cruder practical skepticism that has recently gained 
currency among legal academics as well as the general public.  Critics 
on the left and the right lambaste judges for legislating from the 
bench; a shared understanding of adjudication as political motivates 
both the politicians who block judicial nominations and the academic 
popular constitutionalists who call for taking the Constitution away 
from the courts. 
21
If we are looking to place blame for the crisis, then, it should be on 
those who substitute crass political accusations for real legal analysis.  
While, as Kahan notes, some Justices occasionally make such accusa-
tions, they are not the primary culprits. 
: by explicitly accusing 
the Justices of twisting the law to serve their own biased political 
goals.  If even legal academics now regularly conflate law and politics, 
it is unsurprising that the same cynicism has spread to the general 
public.  And the connection is even more direct than the connection 
between postmodernism and popular beliefs, because many legal aca-
demics who criticize the Court deliberately write for a larger audience, 
seeking out venues other than the law reviews. 
As Kahan recognizes, “mediating institutions” play a critical role in 
“bridging the work of the Court and public consciousness of it,” be-
cause “[m]ost citizens don’t read Supreme Court opinions.”22
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Jerome Frank was perhaps the most radical advocate of the idea that judges were subject to 
political influence, and even he recognized many other influences.  See generally JEROME 
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (republished in many subsequent editions). 
  Legal 
academics — as teachers of future leaders and as knowledgeable pub-
lic commentators — constitute one such important mediating institu-
tion.  The mainstream media often ask legal academics to clarify and 
explain constitutional decisions, and many academics also contribute 
to blogs read by journalists and the general public.  To the extent that 
the professoriate labels opinions we disagree with as “activist” or “po-
 20 The seminal work is JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 21 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Kahan makes this point 
about Scalia’s dissent.  See Kahan, supra note 3, at 3, 32–33, 37–38. 
 22 Kahan, supra note 3, at 29. 
  
2011] DEMOCRACY'S DISTRUST 13 
litical” rather than explaining why they are wrong on the merits, we 
foster exactly the futility and cynicism that Kahan laments.  And un-
like politicians and pundits, who commit the same sins, we should 
know better.  In short, Kahan thinks that Justices should rely less on 
traditional reason-giving; I think that academics should rely on it 
more.  When queried by journalists, or when writing for a mass audi-
ence, we should criticize (or praise) cases on their merits rather than 
blithely attribute the outcomes to the judges’ politics.  Legal academics 
who blame politics for judicial rulings have abdicated their obligation 
to take law seriously. 
Kahan relies too heavily on psychological mechanisms and thus 
fails to see the more banal effects of various forms of academic and po-
litical punditry.  As a result, he expects the solution to come from the 
Justices themselves.  But Kahan’s own examples confound his expecta-
tion: the cases to which Kahan points as examples of his favored ap-
proaches of “aporia” and “affirmation” — Kennedy v. Louisiana23 and 
District of Columbia v. Heller24
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (invalidating death penalty for rape of a child). 
 — were not significantly less divisive 
than any others on controversial topics.  That should not be surprising.  
While I applaud Kahan’s effort in encouraging the Justices to exhibit 
less certitude and to recognize more complexity, the Justices cannot re-
gain trust by relinquishing certitude but only by reclaiming expertise.  
And their expertise will be suspect in cases involving contested values 
as long as we (and occasionally they) continue the drumbeat against 
purportedly activist, political, and illegitimate judicial lawmaking.  
The fault lies not in our cognition but in our accusations. 
 24 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (invalidating ban on handgun possession). 
